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Abstract: Within self-determination theory, integration denotes the process through which people accept past and
present experiences and harmonize these experiences within their sense of self. We investigated associations between
indicators of successful and poor integration of need-related memories and memory-related affect. We also examined
the role of depressive symptoms and self-congruence as antecedents of these indicators. Moreover, we investigated
whether late adults, compared with late adolescents, were better capable of integrating need-frustrating memories
through higher levels of self-congruence. Participants were 132 late adolescents (Mage=17.83) and 147 late adults
(Mage=76.13), who reported on their level of depressive symptoms and self-congruence. Next, participants generated
a need-satisfying and need-frustrating memory and reported on the memories’ integration (in terms of acceptance,
connection and rumination) and associated affect. Whereas depressive symptoms related mainly to the poor integration
of need-frustrating memories, self-congruence related positively to the integration of both need-satisfying and
need-frustrating memories. In turn, integration was related to more positive and less negative affect. Late adults scored
higher than late adolescents on the integration of need-frustrating memories, an effect that was partly accounted for by
late adults’ elevated self-congruence. Results suggest that self-congruence, depressive symptoms and age play a role in
the integration of need-based autobiographical memories. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality
Psychology
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According to self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan,
2000; Vansteenkiste, Niemiec, & Soenens, 2010), a broad
theory on human motivation and socialization, the integra-
tion of past positive and negative experiences is crucial for
individuals’ current adaptive psychological functioning and
thriving. Consistent with developmental theories such as
Erikson’s (1950) model of psychosocial development, SDT
argues that coming to terms with negative experiences from
the past and building an identity containing both positive
and negative past experiences represent a crucial task
throughout the lifespan.
Extant research on the integration of one’s past ex-
periences has focused either on indicators of high-quality
integration (e.g. acceptance; Weinstein, Deci, & Ryan,
2011) or on indicators of poor integration (e.g. rumination;
Mclaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007). Accordingly, a
ﬁrst aim of the present study was to examine indicators of
both high-quality integration and poor integration in
conjunction, and their relation with individuals’ current
affect concerning these past experiences. In doing so, we
focused speciﬁcally on memories related to both the satisfac-
tion and the frustration of the psychological needs for
autonomy (i.e. experience of volition), competence (i.e. ex-
perience of effectiveness) and relatedness (i.e. experience
of closeness), as these have been found to represent a crucial
aspect of autobiographical memories (for an overview see
Milyavskaya, Philippe, & Koestner, 2013). The second aim
was to investigate whether personal characteristics would
relate to individuals’ degree of integration of past events.
Speciﬁcally, we examined associations with depressive
symptoms and self-congruence (i.e. experiencing oneself as
the author of one’s behaviours; Weinstein, Przybylski, &
Ryan, 2013). Finally, although previous research has indi-
cated that people become better capable of integrating (espe-
cially negative) past events as they grow older (e.g. Torges,
Stewart, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008), the exact mechanism
behind this developmental trend is less clear. Therefore, in
the current mixed age group involving both late adolescents
and late adults, we examined whether older individuals’
higher display of self-congruent functioning (e.g. Sheldon
& Kasser, 2001) may be a possible mechanism.
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The integration of autobiographical memories
The integrative process is a central aspect of many theories of
personality development (e.g. Rogers, 1963) and autobio-
graphical memory (e.g. Bauer, McAdams, & Pals, 2008;
Pillemer, 1992). In this study, we drew upon SDT (Deci &
Ryan, 2000; Ryan, 1995), where integration is deﬁned as
the process through which people acknowledge and come
to accept various aspects (i.e. emotions, behaviours and
cognitions) of their past, present and future functioning,
and bring these aspects into harmony to form a uniﬁed sense
of self (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Weinstein et al., 2013). This
integrative process comes into play when individuals are
confronted with past experiences that are at odds with one
another or that are inconsistent with personally held ideals
and values. Such a confrontation challenges individuals to
integrate past experiences into a coherent whole. To
illustrate, an experience of social exclusion may threaten a
person’s worldview that the world is trustworthy, an experi-
ence that needs to be acknowledged and integrated. The
failure to do so may cause internal conﬂict, which then
may manifest through rumination about the event. However,
this process of integration can be painful because the full
acknowledgement of negative memories may elicit feelings
of sadness, fear and anger (Mills & D’Mello, 2014). In
addition, also positive and rewarding experiences need to be
assimilated within one’s sense of self. In other words, this in-
tegrative process involves both positive and negative experi-
ences, which together should nourish the formation of a
meaningful and coherent life narrative (Bauer et al., 2008). In-
deed, people with life narratives that include both positive and
negative past events were found to experience greater overall
well-being (e.g. McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008) and to have
clearer goals for the future (e.g. Pillemer & Kuwabara, 2012).
In the present study, we focused on two indicators of
adaptive integrative processing, namely, acceptance of past
events and the degree to which one feels connected with one-
self as a person when the event took place. To the extent that
people accept a past event and feel a bond with the person
they were at the time of the event, it indicates that the event
has gained a more meaningful place within their personal life
narrative. Weinstein et al. (2011; Study 5) asked students to
reﬂect on a negative (i.e. shameful or regretful) or positive
(i.e. a happy or contented) life event that had a strong impact
on them, thereby indicating their acceptance of and
connection with this event. Integration of both the positive
and negative event, as indicated by greater acceptance and
connection, was related to higher well-being (Weinstein
et al., 2011).
The integrative process can also go awry. Two indicators
of poor integration are rumination and intrusion. Whereas
rumination refers to the tendency to think repetitively about
one’s feelings and problems (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, &
Lyubomirsky, 2008), intrusions refer to the involuntary
recollection of past negative events (Brewin, 1998). Both
phenomena have been found to mutually reinforce one an-
other (e.g. Smets, Wessel, Schreurs, & Raes, 2012) and are
both related to negative emotional outcomes (e.g. Mclaughlin
et al., 2007; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005).
Studies thus far have focused almost exclusively either
on indicators of successful integration (e.g. acceptance;
Weinstein et al., 2011) or on variables indicative of poor inte-
gration (e.g. rumination; Mclaughlin et al., 2007). A simulta-
neous examination of both sides is needed to get a more
complete view on the integrative process, as the absence of
poor integration does not by deﬁnition imply the presence
of adaptive integration. To illustrate, a person who does not
ruminate over a negative event (i.e. displaying an absence
of poor integration) does not necessarily fully accept this
event. Therefore, we examined both indicators of successful
and poor integration and their relation with memory-related
affect. We thereby examined the integration of experiences
of need satisfaction and need frustration speciﬁcally, because
such experiences would be vitally important to individuals’
well-being.
Psychological need satisfaction and need frustration in
autobiographical memories
A central tenet in SDT is that individuals’ well-being largely
depends on the satisfaction of their psychological needs of
autonomy, competence and relatedness (Deci & Ryan,
2000; Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). Autonomy refers to the de-
gree to which one experiences a sense of choice and volition
when carrying out activities. Competence signiﬁes the ten-
dency to develop one’s skills and to gain a sense of control
over desired outcomes. Relatedness entails the inclination
to connect to other people and to have loving and trustworthy
relationships. While satisfaction of these psychological needs
has been found to relate positively to a variety of beneﬁcial
outcomes (e.g. life satisfaction and vitality), their frustration
has been found to relate to negative outcomes (e.g. anxiety
and aggression; Chen et al., 2015; Deci & Ryan, 2000;
Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013).
Recent research also suggests that need satisfaction and
frustration play an important role in people’s memories of
past personal events. A number of studies examined people’s
experienced need satisfaction at the episodic level and found
that participants’ need satisfaction, as experienced in their
memories, contributed uniquely to their well-being, above
and beyond the contribution of people’s concurrent need
satisfaction (e.g. Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier,
Lecours, & Lekes, 2012). Similarly, need satisfaction as ex-
perienced in couple-related memories predicted relationship
quality 1 year later (Philippe, Koestner, & Lekes, 2013),
whereas need frustration in a loss-related memory (i.e. the
loss of something or someone important) was related to more
depressive emotions (Philippe, Koestner, Lecours, Beaulieu-
Pelletier, & Bois, 2011). Thus, need satisfaction and frustra-
tion represent important and unique aspects of individuals’
autobiographical memories that help to explain why recalling
such memories engenders positive or negative feelings (cf.
Philippe et al., 2012). We aim to examine whether the extent
to which both need-satisfying (NSM) and need-frustrating
memories (NFM) engender positive or negative feelings
depends on the degree to which individuals have integrated
or failed to integrate these past events.
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The role of depressive symptoms and self-congruence in
the integrative process
As the integration of past events is crucial for individuals’
psychological functioning, we sought to examine whether
and how two potentially relevant individual difference vari-
ables, namely, depressive symptoms and self-congruence,
may relate to the integration of need-satisfying and need-
frustrating autobiographical memories. Depression has been
characterized as a disorder involving disturbances in one’s
reﬂections of the past (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).
Depressed individuals retrieve negative memories more
frequently and, at the same time, are affected more strongly
by this recollection of negative past events (Watkins, Grimm,
Whitney, & Brown, 2005). This increased sensitivity to neg-
ative past events can be explained by the fact that individuals
with elevated depressive symptoms or diagnosed with de-
pression are more prone to intrusions of stressful memories
(Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999) and are more likely to
ruminate over past negative events (Watkins & Teasdale,
2001), suggesting that they often fail to integrate past
negative or stressful events. A few studies have also focused
on positive memories and found that individuals high on
depressive symptoms identify less with such memories (e.g.
Lemogne et al., 2006; Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2012).
For example, Janssen, Hearne and Takarangi (2015) found
that depressive symptoms were related to a stronger feeling
of distance from positive past events. Depression thus seems
to be characterized by a repetitive dwelling on negative mem-
ories and a feeling of detachment from positive memories.
Whereas most studies on autobiographical memories
have focused on vulnerability factors (e.g. depressive symp-
toms) for a poor integration of past events, we additionally
focused on a potentially integration-promoting factor, that
is, self-congruence. Self-congruence refers to individuals’
tendency to regulate their behaviour on the basis of person-
ally endorsed values, interests and preferences, rather than
on the basis of externally imposed expectations (Weinstein
et al., 2013). Self-congruent functioning is related to
desirable outcomes, including higher psychological need
satisfaction, greater acceptance of one’s strengths and
weaknesses, and higher well-being (Weinstein, Przybylski,
& Ryan, 2012; Yu, Assor, & Liu, 2015).
As individuals high in self-congruence are aware of their
own most fundamental values and interests, they have a clear
criterion to evaluate and reﬂect upon important life events.
As such, this awareness is likely to facilitate the assimilation
of past life experiences into a coherent and meaningful sense
of self (i.e. the process of integration). In addition, people
high on self-congruence have been shown to be open to
and interested in their own experiences and to take responsi-
bility for their own actions (Weinstein et al., 2012). For these
reasons, we expected that these individuals would be better
capable of integrating both positive and negative past events.
Although no study thus far investigated directly the relation
between self-congruence and the integration of past events,
indirect evidence was provided by Weinstein et al. (2011).
They found that an autonomous personality orientation, a
concept closely aligned with the notion of self-congruence,
was positively related to the integration of central positive
and negative life events.
Age and the integration of autobiographical memories:
the role of self-congruence
Erikson (1950) identiﬁed the achievement of a sense of ego-
integrity as the central developmental task of late adulthood.
When achieving ego-integrity, people experience a sense of
unity, harmony and completeness in their identity. Key to
the successful resolution of this task is an exploration and
contemplation of life as a whole and a capacity to reconcile
positive and negative past events. This is also in line with
socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, Fung, &
Charles, 2003), which states that, as people get older, they
become more skilled in enhancing their current well-being,
for example, by reappraising negative events and by remem-
bering positive stimuli better than negative stimuli (for an
overview, see Mather & Carstensen, 2005).
From these theories, it can be derived that late adults,
compared with younger people, would be better at integrat-
ing past events. Research has shown that late adults indeed
display a better integration of memories and of negative
memories in particular. To illustrate, older, relative to
younger, individuals reported memories that contained more
statements about what the memory has taught the individual
about the self or the world (e.g. Singer, Rexhaj, & Baddeley,
2007), which provides indirect evidence for the idea that they
better accept the memory. Further, Torges et al. (2008) found
that older (compared with younger) individuals were better
able at accepting mistakes they had made towards a deceased
loved one, with such acceptance relating to higher levels of
well-being.
Although previous studies indicated that older individ-
uals are better capable of integrating past events, the mecha-
nisms behind this relation are less clear. SDT predicts that, as
individuals grow older, they move towards higher levels of
self-congruence, indicating that individuals act more
according to personally endorsed values (Deci & Ryan,
2000). A number of studies have shown that people indeed
display more self-congruent functioning with increasing
age. For instance, older individuals have been found to feel
more autonomous while voting, tipping and paying taxes
(Sheldon, Kasser, Houser-Marko, Jones, & Turban, 2005)
and more often strive for personally important and
self-determined goals (Sheldon & Kasser, 2001). Older
individuals were also found to attach less importance to
extrinsic goals (e.g. status), that is, goals characterized by
a focus on others’ approval and by a lack of self-congruence
(Kasser & Ryan, 1996). Based on this evidence, we ex-
pected that higher levels of self-congruence would explain,
in part, why older individuals would be better at integrating
past events.
The present study
The overall goal of this study was to investigate whether the
integration of need-related memories relates to individuals’
currently experienced positive and negative affect with
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respect to these memories. We reasoned that, when a
personal memory event still elicits negative affect today,
there is a remaining scar and the event has not been fully
processed and accepted yet. In contrast, when the event
comes with more positive affect today, it has been processed
more fully and more adequately. Thus, we expected that
high-quality integration of past events would relate to
positive affect and that poor integration would relate to
negative affect. We also examined whether depressive
symptoms, self-congruence and age would relate to this
integrative process.
Speciﬁcally, the following three hypotheses were exam-
ined in a mixed sample of late adolescents and late adults.
First, we examined to what extent different indicators of
high-quality integration (i.e. connection and acceptance)
and poor integration (i.e. rumination and intrusion) related
to individuals’ memory-related affect (Hypothesis 1). As
need satisfaction and frustration represent crucial aspects
of autobiographical memories (Milyavskaya et al., 2013),
we focused on memories involving experiences of both
need satisfaction and need frustration. We expected that
connection to and acceptance of both NSM and NFM
would relate to more positive and less negative affect,
whereas an opposite pattern was expected for rumination
and intrusions (which were only assessed with respect to
the NFM).
Second, we investigated whether depressive symptoms
and self-congruence related to this integrative process. We
expected that self-congruence would relate to more positive
and less negative affect, with better integration (as indicated
by higher levels of connection and acceptance, and lower
levels of rumination and intrusions) of both NSM and NFM
accounting for this association (i.e. mediation). An opposite
pattern of results was anticipated with regard to depressive
symptoms (Hypothesis 2).
The sampling of a mixed age-group, involving both late
adolescents and late adults, allowed us to investigate the
role of age in two different ways. First, we examined
whether the proposed theoretical model would hold across
both late adolescents and late adults (Hypothesis 3a).
Second, in terms of mean-level differences, we expected
late adults to display more acceptance and connection and
less rumination and intrusions than late adolescents, with
this age difference being accounted for by the presence of
higher levels of self-congruence among elderly people
(Hypothesis 3b).
METHOD
Participants and procedure
Participants were late adolescents (N=132; Mage= 17.83;
SD= .94; range: 16–22 years) and late adults (N=147;
Mage= 76.13; SD=7.57; range: 61–93 years). In both
groups, there were slightly more women than men (late ado-
lescents: 56.1%; elderly individuals: 66.0%). Of the late ad-
olescents, 65 were ﬁrst-year undergraduate students in
psychology, and 67 were sixth-grade high school
students.1All high school students were following an aca-
demic track (i.e. a track that prepares them for higher
education). Among the elderly people, the highest level of
education obtained was 17.4% primary school, 59.1% high
school and 23.6% higher education.
Both the late adolescents and the late adults were re-
cruited by undergraduate students in return for course credits.
These students received a 1-h information session about the
purpose of the study and the recruitment procedures to en-
sure that participants would be recruited in a standardized
way. With respect to the late adults, students were asked to
search for individuals of at least 65 years old who were will-
ing to participate in the study. After informing participants
that participation was voluntary, that they could withdraw
their participation at any moment and that the data would
be processed in a conﬁdential way, undergraduate students
were present to provide, if needed, assistance when partici-
pants were ﬁlling out the questionnaires.
We decided to let the participants ﬁrst ﬁll out the general
questionnaires and subsequently the memory-related ques-
tionnaires because this order of presentation has been found
to be most methodologically sound (Philippe, Bouizegarene,
Guilbault, Rajotte, & Houle, 2015). With a reversed order of
presentation, there is a greater likelihood that ratings on the
general questionnaires (depression and self-congruence)
will be affected by the valence of the retrieved memories.
Thus, participants ﬁrst ﬁlled out questionnaires assessing
depressive symptoms and self-congruence. Next, participants
were instructed to think of two need-related memories. We
used a mixed design with the type of need-related memory
(i.e. autonomy, competence or relatedness) representing a
between-subject factor and with the valence of the memory
(i.e. satisfaction or frustration) being a within-subject factor.
Younger and older participants were distributed equally over
the three between-subject conditions, χ2 (2, N=274) = .16,
p= .92. In counterbalanced order, all participants were asked
to generate one satisfying and one frustrating memory, which
related to a single need.2 Speciﬁcally, participants were
instructed to think back to and shortly describe an event
wherein they felt free to do things that were congruent with
their personal interests and values (i.e. autonomy satisfaction
condition), or successful in doing something that was impor-
tant to them (i.e. competence satisfaction condition), or
connected to other people who were important to them (i.e.
relatedness satisfaction condition). Then, they generated an
event during which they felt forced to act or think in a partic-
ular way (i.e. autonomy frustration condition), or as if they
failed in something that was important to them (i.e. compe-
tence frustration condition), or rejected or excluded by people
who were important to them (i.e. relatedness frustration
condition). The instructions also stated that this event needed
1Results of independent samples t-tests indicated that there were no mean-
level differences with respect to the outcome variables between the high
school and undergraduate students (t-values ranging between 1.70 and
1.49, p> .05).
2Results of a MANOVA showed that the order of the retrieved memory (i.e.
reporting ﬁrst on either a need-satisfying or need-frustrating memory), which
was entered as a between-subject factor, did not affect the degree of experi-
enced autonomy, competence, and relatedness satisfaction and frustration in
the reported memory (F(6, 251) = .89, p> .05, η2 = .02).
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to be personally important to them. We have provided some
examples of the recalled memories in Table 1. After this short
description, participants ﬁlled out questionnaires tapping into
memory-related experiences, as explained in the succeeding
discussion.
Measures
All items were answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1
(not at all true) to 5 (completely true), unless indicated
otherwise.
General measures
Depressive symptoms. Participants were administered the
Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression scale
(CES-D; Radloff, 1977) to assess depressive symptoms
experienced during the past week. The CES-D has been
shown to assess mostly trait instead of state depression and
is suitable for non-clinical populations (Spielberger,
Ritterband, Reheiser, & Brunner, 2003). We employed a
shortened version of the CES-D consisting of six items
(e.g. ‘I felt depressed’; Van Hiel & Vansteenkiste, 2009).
Items were rated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0
(rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the time).
This scale was reliable (α= .83).
Self-congruence. Self-congruence was assessed with the
‘authorship/self-congruence’ subscale of the index of
autonomous functioning (Weinstein et al., 2012). This
subscale consists of ﬁve items (e.g. ‘My decisions represent
my most important values and feelings’) and was reliable
(α= .80).
Memory-related measures
Memory characteristics: emotional intensity and
centrality. Memories can differ in terms of emotional
intensity (e.g. Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004) and
centrality to individuals’ identity and life story (Berntsen &
Rubin, 2006). We measured these features of memories in
order to control for them in the main analyses. Participants
were asked to rate the emotional intensity of the event (one
item) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all
intense) to 5 (very intense). The centrality of the event was
measured using four items of the seven-item version of the
centrality of event scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). This
scale had an adequate reliability (satisfaction memory:
α= .76; frustration memory: α= .74).
Need satisfaction and frustration experienced in the
memory. To obtain a manipulation check and to examine
whether participants indeed reported on the need as
speciﬁed in the instructions, participants were asked to rate
the degree of need satisfaction (three items; one per need)
and need frustration (three items; one per need) they had
experienced during the recalled event. These items were
derived from a memory-related psychological need
satisfaction scale (Philippe et al., 2011) and from the basic
psychological need satisfaction and frustration scale (Chen
et al., 2015). Items (e.g. ‘I felt free to do things and to
think how I wanted’; autonomy satisfaction) were rated on
a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (don’t agree at all) to
5 (completely agree). Items assessing need frustration were
reverse scored and averaged with the items assessing need
satisfaction. This score, which reﬂects experiences of need
satisfaction (versus need frustration), was reliable both for
the NSM (α= .67) and for the NFM (α= .66).
Connection. Participants rated the degree to which they
felt connected with the person they were in the memory
using four items (e.g. ‘I feel connected to the person I was
then’), which were taken from Weinstein et al. (2011). This
scale had an adequate reliability (satisfaction memory:
α= .76; frustration memory: α= .71).
Acceptance. Acceptance of the reported event was assessed
with six items (e.g. ‘I accept this event’). These items were
adapted from three previously used scales, namely, a scale
assessing acceptance of a central past life event (Weinstein
Table 1. Examples of the recalled memories
Type of memory Example Reporter
Autonomy
satisfaction
‘My parents were always very strict about everything. I could make only a few decisions by myself.
But when my godmother went to talk with my parents about going to the university, I was allowed
to make my own decisions for the ﬁrst time. As soon as I went to university, I really had a feeling
of freedom.’ Late adult
Competence
satisfaction
‘When I received an award for Spanish in my last year of high school. Because I had invested a lot
of effort and attached a lot of value to it.’ Late adolescent
Relatedness
satisfaction
‘A birthday party where we (I, my husband, children, and grandchildren), went out for a surprise
diner and visited an amusement park afterwards. At that moment I was in a wheelchair because of
a knee operation. It was winter and it had snowed. The grandchildren liked it a lot to guide me in
my wheelchair through the park in the snow. I’m really grateful for this beautiful memory.’ Late adult
Autonomy
frustration
‘In the fourth year of high school I followed the track ‘Latin-Mathematics’. I had chosen this track
because I wanted to give it a try. When I wanted to change my track a year later, my father did not
allow this. So I did this track another half year against my will. Eventually I changed my track
without my father knowing.’ Late adolescent
Competence
frustration
‘At a certain moment I had a big ﬁght with my son. Today, I feel like I was too rude towards him.
I had beaten him, something I had never done before. At that moment I felt like a failure because I
was unable to control my anger.’ Late adult
Relatedness
frustration
‘I was in the same class as both my best friends and my romantic partner. My friends thought that
my partner changed me. During our last 100 days in the ﬁnal year of high school they ran out on
me and did not support me anymore. My partner did not understand that this rejection hurt me.’ Late adolescent
Integration and need-related memories
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et al., 2011), the acceptance subscale of the Illness Cognition
Questionnaire assessing the acceptance of an illness (Evers
et al., 2001) and the acceptance subscale of the Cognitive
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire assessing acceptance of
a negative event (Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001).
This scale was reliable (satisfaction memory: α= .79;
frustration memory: α= .87).
Rumination and intrusions. Rumination, which was only
assessed with respect to the NFM, was measured with four
items (e.g. ‘I tend to “ruminate” or dwell over this event’)
of the 12 item-rumination subscale of the Rumination–
Reﬂection Questionnaire (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999;
Luyckx et al., 2008). Intrusion was assessed with three items
(e.g. ‘I often think about this event without wanting to do
so’) of the seven-item intrusion subscale of the impact of
event scale (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979; Brom &
Kleber, 1985). Items were selected based on their relevance
for past events. As previous studies found rumination and
intrusion to often go hand in hand (e.g. Smets et al., 2012)
and because these two sets of items were highly correlated
in the current study (r= .77; p< .01), they were averaged to
form a composite score, which we refer to as ‘rumination’.
This scale had a good reliability (α= .89).
Positive and negative affect. Current positive and negative
affect when thinking back to the generated memory was
assessed with, respectively, eight (e.g. ‘happy’) and seven
(e.g. ‘angry’) items, which were partly based on the
positive and negative affect schedule (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988). These items were preceded by the stem
‘While thinking back to this event, I feel …’ and were
rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all
true) to 7 (completely true). The scale assessing positive
affect was reliable (satisfaction memory: α= .88; frustration
memory: α= .89), as was the scale for negative affect
(satisfaction memory: α= .84; frustration memory: α= .82).
Plan of analyses
The main hypotheses were examined by modelling three
structural path models using MPlus 7 (Muthén & Muthén,
1998–2012) using maximum-likelihood estimation. First,
we ran a model with our three indicators of (poor) integration
(i.e. connection, acceptance and rumination) as predictors of
memory-related affect (positive and negative; cf. Hypothesis
1). Thereby, we allowed variables at the same level to
covary. In a second model, we added self-congruence and de-
pressive symptoms as predictors of the indicators of integra-
tion (cf. Hypothesis 2). These ﬁrst two structural models
were tested separately for the NSM and for the NFM. As ru-
mination was only assessed for the NFM, this variable was
not included in the NSM models. Additionally, for both
models, we performed a multigroup comparison to examine
whether the observed associations would be (dis)similar for
late adolescents and late adults (cf. Hypothesis 3a). To do
so, we compared an unconstrained model, in which all path
coefﬁcients were allowed to vary across the two subsamples
with a constrained model, in which all path coefﬁcients were
set equal across both subsamples. Both models were com-
pared using the difference in chi-square (Δχ2), which should
be non-signiﬁcant, and with the difference in comparative ﬁt
index (ΔCFI), which should be lower than .01 (Cheung &
Rensvold, 2002) in order to favour the constrained over the
unconstrained model. When the model ﬁt was signiﬁcantly
different (which would indicate that the relations were
moderated by subsample), we estimated partially constrained
models, where we gradually constrained path coefﬁcients, as
to determine which speciﬁc relations were signiﬁcantly
different across subsamples. Subsequently, we examined by
means of MANCOVAs the existence of signiﬁcant mean-
level differences between the adolescent and elderly subsam-
ple with regard to the study variables. Finally, in a third and
ﬁnal model, we examined whether subsample (i.e. the adoles-
cent and elderly subsample) related to self-congruence, which
in turn would relate to our indicators of integration (cf. Hy-
pothesis 3b). In total, 3.01% of the data was missing. These
missing data were missing completely at random, as the
normed χ2/df (164.14/129) was 1.27 (i.e. smaller than the
recommended cut-off of 2; Ullman, 2001). Because missing
data were missing at random, the use of the full information
maximum likelihood procedure was appropriate to estimate
missing data (Schafer & Graham, 2002). We employed
several indices to evaluate the ﬁt of the path models, namely,
the χ2 test, the CFI, the standardized root mean square resid-
ual (SRMR) and the root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA). An acceptable ﬁt was indicated by χ2/df ratio of 2
or below, CFI values of .95 or above, SRMR values of .08 or
below and RMSEA values of .06 or below (Hu & Bentler,
1999; Kline, 2005). To test the signiﬁcance of indirect effects,
we used bootstrapping (using 1000 draws), a nonparametric
resampling procedure that is currently highly recommended
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses
First, a paired-samples t-test indicated that individuals re-
ported more experienced need satisfaction in the need satis-
faction condition (M=4.09; SD= .65) than in the need
frustration condition (M=2.68; SD= .79), t(261) = 22.67,
p< .01.3 The bivariate correlations between the study
variables, separated by subsample, can be found in Table 2.
Further, results of two repeated measures ANOVAs with
type of memory (i.e., NSM and NFM) as a within-subject
factor and with population as a between-subject factor
showed that although there was no difference in the
emotional intensity between the generated NSM and NFM
(F(1, 259) = .05, p> .05, η2 = .00), the two types of memories
did differ with respect to centrality (F(1, 256) = 56.02,
p< .001, η2 = .18). More speciﬁcally, NSM (M=3.61;
SD= .93) were rated to be more central than NFM (M=3.02;
3When entering the type of recalled need-satisfying or need-frustrating mem-
ory (i.e. autonomy, competence or relatedness) as a between-subject factor in
a MANOVA, participants were found to report more satisfaction or frustra-
tion of the need that was speciﬁed in the instructions compared with the sat-
isfaction or frustration of the other two needs (F(12, 502) = 7.89, p< .01,
η2 = .16).
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SD=1.03). The interaction between type of memory and pop-
ulation was non-signiﬁcant (emotional intensity: F(1, 259)
= 2.29, p> .05, η2 = .01; centrality: F(1, 256) = .44, p> .05,
η2 = .00). Elderly individuals did report more emotionally
intense (NSM: M=4.38; SD= .97 and NFM: M=4.24;
SD=1.08) and central memories (NSM: M=3.82; SD= .91
and NFM: M=3.17; SD= .98) than late adolescents
(intensity: NSM: M=3.70; SD=1.02 and NFM: M=3.81;
SD=1.05; centrality: NSM: M=3.39; SD= .91 and NFM:
M=2.85; SD=1.04; F(1, 259) = 30.76, p< .001, η2 = .11
and F(1, 256) = 17.29, p< .001, η2 = .06, respectively).
Finally, independent-samples t-tests indicated that men
and women differed with respect to depressive symptoms,
with women (elderly individuals: M= .65; SD= .62; late
adolescents:M= .77; SD= .64) experiencing more depressive
symptoms than men (elderly individuals: M= .41; SD= .50;
late adolescents: M= .47; SD= .44), t(145) = 2.42, p< .05
and t(130) =3.04, p< .01. In the adolescent subsample,
women experienced less acceptance (M=3.51; SD=1.15),
less positive affect (M=2.07; SD=1.05) and more negative
affect (M=4.80; SD=1.32) with respect to the NFM than
men (M=3.87; SD= .73; M=2.60; SD=1.06; M=4.27;
SD=1.29, respectively), t(125) =2.07, p< .05; t(127)
=2.83, p< .01; t(127) = 2.27, p< .05. Given these ﬁndings,
we controlled for gender, emotional intensity and centrality
in our main analyses.
Primary analyses
Hypothesis 1: The Relation between integration and memory-
related affect
In a ﬁrst structural model, we examined the unique
relation between the three integration variables and current
memory-related positive and negative affect. Both the NSM
and the NFM model had a perfect ﬁt because they were fully
saturated. As displayed in Figure 1, in line with our
expectations, connection and acceptance with respect to both
the NSM and NFM were related to more positive affect and
less negative affect (although connection only yielded a
marginally signiﬁcant relation with negative affect in the
NSM). Rumination about the NFM showed the exact
opposite pattern of associations. Then, we performed a
multigroup comparison to examine whether the observed
associations would be similar for late adolescents and late
adults. The constrained model ﬁtted the data equally well as
the unconstrained model, both for the NSM (Δχ2 (5) = 7.32,
p> .05 and ΔCFI= .01) and for the NFM (Δχ2 (7) = 12.24,
p> .05 and ΔCFI= .02), suggesting that the observed
associations in Figure 1 applied similarly to late adolescents
and late adults.
Hypothesis 2: The role of self-congruence and depressive symptoms
The second model built upon the ﬁrst by adding self-
congruence and depressive symptoms as predictors of con-
nection, acceptance and rumination.4 Both the NSM and
NFM models had a good ﬁt (NSM: χ2/df= .40; CFI =1.00;
SRMR= .01; RMSEA= .00; NFM: χ2/df= .29; CFI =1.00;
SRMR= .01; RMSEA= .00). As displayed in Figure 2, self-
congruence related positively to connection and acceptance,
both with respect to the NSM and with respect to the NFM,
while it was unrelated to rumination in the NFM. The
relation between depressive symptoms and integration
indicators was mixed and dependent on the type of
memory. That is, whereas depressive symptoms related
negatively to connection with NSM (but was unrelated to
connection with NFM), it related negatively to acceptance
of NFM (but was unrelated to acceptance of NSM).
Finally, depressive symptoms related positively to
Figure 1. First structural model depicting the relation between indicators of (poor) integration and memory-related affect in need-satisfying and need-frustrating
memories.
4When re-analysing the second structural model this time using either only
rumination or intrusion (instead of the averaged score), we found evidence
for a similar pattern of ﬁndings.
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rumination over NFM. The relations between the indicators
of integration and affect were similar to these relations as
observed in the ﬁrst model.
Next, we allowed in a stepwise fashion direct paths from
self-congruence and depressive symptoms to positive and
negative affect. None of these direct paths were signiﬁcant,
indicating that self-congruence and depressive symptoms
were related to affect only indirectly, through the integration
variables. Bootstrapping procedures indicated that, as for
self-congruence, the most robust indirect associations were
found via acceptance: self-congruence was related indi-
rectly to both positive and negative affect via acceptance,
a ﬁnding observed in both the NSM (95% CI [.064, .195]
for positive affect; 95% CI [.204, .068] for negative
affect) and NFM (95% CI [.011, .094] for positive affect;
95% CI [.083, .006] for negative affect). Additionally,
self-congruence also related indirectly to positive affect
via connection in the NFM (95% CI [.010, .104]). As for
depressive symptoms, only the indirect effects for the
NFM were signiﬁcant and were carried by both acceptance
and rumination. Speciﬁcally, depressive symptoms were
related indirectly to negative affect through rumination
(95% CI [.008, .099]) and to positive affect through
acceptance (95% CI [.089, .001]) and rumination (95%
CI [.090, .008]).
Similar to the ﬁrst model, we performed a multigroup
analysis to examine whether the associations in this second
model would be similar for late adolescents and late adults.
For the NSM, this was indeed the case as the constrained
model ﬁtted the data equally well as the unconstrained model
(Δχ2 (14) = 12.62, p> .05 and ΔCFI= .00). For the NFM, the
ﬁt of the unconstrained model was signiﬁcantly better than
the ﬁt of the constrained model (Δχ2 (20) = 36.47, p< .05
and ΔCFI= .03), but was similar to the ﬁt of a partially
constrained model (Δχ2 (17) = 21.98, p> .05 and
ΔCFI = .01). More speciﬁcally, in this latter model, the nega-
tive relation between rumination and positive affect was
stronger among the elderly individuals (β =.29, p< .01)
than among the late adolescents (β =.18, p< .05).5
Hypothesis 3: The role of self-congruence in the relation between
age group and integration
To shed further light on the possible intervening role of
self-congruence, we examined whether any age-related
differences in integration could be accounted for by self-
congruence. First, a series of MANCOVAs (controlling for
gender, emotional intensity and centrality) indicated that
elderly individuals, when compared with late adolescents,
scored higher on self-congruence and reported more connec-
tion, greater acceptance, more positive affect and less
negative affect with respect to NFM (Table 3). There were
no signiﬁcant mean-level differences between the two age
groups with respect to depressive symptoms, integration of
the NSM and affect related to the NSM. In a next step, we
examined the intervening role of self-congruence in the rela-
tion between subsample and integration. As the elderly only
displayed greater integration of NFM and as no difference
between both subsamples was found with respect to rumina-
tion, we limited ourselves to a structural model involving
NFM only and including both indicators of high-quality
integration (i.e. connection and acceptance). Speciﬁcally,
we inserted self-congruence as an intervening variable in
the relation between subsample and integration. Additionally,
direct paths from subsample to both integration indicators
were allowed. Because this model was fully saturated, it had
a perfect ﬁt. As illustrated in Figure 3, subsample related
positively to self-congruence, with self-congruence, in turn,
relating to more connection with and acceptance of NFM.
Both indirect relations were signiﬁcant (connection: 95% CI
5As connection correlated signiﬁcantly with acceptance (r =.18, p> .05)
and rumination (r = .46, p< .01) among the late adolescents, but not in the
elderly individuals (respectively, r = .12 and r = .02, both p> .05), these
paths were also unconstrained.
Figure 2. Second structural model depicting the relation between personal characteristics, indicators of (poor) integration and memory-related affect in need-
satisfying and need-frustrating memories.
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[.004, .076]; acceptance: 95% CI [.006, .075]). In addition to
these indirect effects, subsample also related directly to both
connection and acceptance. Thus, elderly individuals
displayed better integration, which was partly explained by
higher levels of self-congruence.6
DISCUSSION
Several organismic theories in the domains of developmental
psychology (Erikson, 1950), clinical psychology (Rogers,
1963), personality psychology (Ryan, 1995) and cognitive
psychology (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) highlight the importance
of integration, a process involving the acknowledgement of
past negative events and the capacity to synthesize these
events with positive events into a coherent whole. In spite
of its importance, this complex process of integration has
only recently begun to receive increasing empirical attention
(Weinstein et al., 2011). The general aims of the present
study was to study different indicators of both successful
and poor integration of need-related positive and negative
memories and to examine how these indicators relate to
individuals’ current positive and negative affect about these
memories. Moreover, in addition to investigating the role of
a potentially integration-impeding factor (i.e. depressive
symptoms), we investigated the role of a personal
characteristic hypothesized to foster this process (i.e. self-
congruence). Finally, because previous studies (e.g. Singer
et al., 2007) have found that elderly people are better capable
of integrating (especially negative) memories, we examined
whether self-congruence could be part of the mechanism
explaining this age-related effect.
Further insights in the process of integration
A contemporary and empirically driven framework that
assigns a pivotal role to the process of integration is SDT
(Deci & Ryan, 2000). Integration is assigned an important
role in individuals’ psychological functioning as this process
enables them to achieve a greater sense of unity, thereby
allowing individuals to function in a more volitional way
(Weinstein et al., 2013). Indeed, to experience a full sense
of volition and psychological freedom in one’s current func-
tioning, one needs to acknowledge and accept both positive
and negative past events. Non-synthesized events may come
with internal conﬂict, which may surface through (unwanted)
rumination about the event. Previous studies have indicated
that the integration of past events, as indicated by higher
acceptance, is related to well-being (Weinstein et al., 2011)
and that poor integration of previous events, as indicated by
repetitive ruminative thinking, is related to ill-being (Michael
et al., 2005). In this study, we aimed to shed a more
comprehensive view on the process of integration, by focus-
ing simultaneously on indicators of high-quality integration
and poor integration.
Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that both ac-
ceptance of the event and experiencing a sense of connection
with the person one was at the time of the event were related
positively to current positive affect and negatively to current
negative affect. These ﬁndings were obtained for both the
NSM (i.e. positive) and the NFM (i.e. negative) and emerged
even after controlling for the emotional salience and the
centrality of the recalled event. In contrast, ruminating over
NFM was related to less positive and more negative affect.
Although all three indicators related uniquely to both
positive and negative memory-related affect, we found that,
across both types of memories, acceptance of the event was
the most robust predictor (although rumination was equally
important in the NFM). Possibly, acceptance may be the
most direct indicator of the process of integration, as it
indicates that one has currently given the event a meaningful
place within one’s personally held values, ideals and self-
views. That is, acceptance indicates that one takes responsi-
bility for what happened, thereby achieving a greater sense
of authorship over the event (see also Erikson, 1950).
Although we focused on the unique contribution of these
different indicators of integration, it is likely that in reality
they do not function in isolation but are interdependent. For
example, acceptance of and rumination over need-frustrating
events may reciprocally relate to one another, an issue that
could be examined in a longitudinal design. Continuous
dwelling over a negative event may preclude its acceptance,
whereas a fuller acceptance may lead one to ruminate less
about this event. Interestingly, although feeling connected
6We performed multigroup analyses based on the type of need (i.e. auton-
omy, competence and relatedness) addressed in the memory for both Models
2 and 3. These results showed that, in general, the relations in the models
were similar across the three need-related memories.
Table 3. Comparison between the late adolescents and elderly
individuals with respect to the study variables
Late
adolescents
Elderly
individuals
F-valueM (SD) M (SD)
Personal characteristics
Self-congruence 3.73 (.55) 3.97 (.57) 13.40**
Depressive symptoms .64 (.58) .57 (.59) 1.93
Indicators of (poor) integration
Connection with
person – NSM 3.93 (.84) 3.97 (.87) .81
Connection with
person – NFM 2.95 (.92) 3.44 (.92) 17.81**
Acceptance of event –
NSM 4.27 (.59) 4.34 (.71) .03
Acceptance of event –
NFM 3.66 (1.00) 3.92 (.83) 6.94*
Rumination over
event – NFM 2.58 (1.13) 2.63 (1.01) 3.23
Memory-related affect
Positive affect – NSM 5.59 (1.29) 5.51 (1.33) .91
Positive affect – NFM 2.30 (1.08) 3.05 (1.61) 21.45**
Negative affect – NSM 1.97 (1.10) 2.06 (1.31) .31
Negative affect – NFM 4.57 (1.33) 3.92 (1.52) 21.56**
NSM, need-satisfying memory; NFM, need-frustrating memory.
*p< .05;
**p< .01.
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with a negative memory related to more positive affect, it
also related to more rumination (although only among late
adolescents). The latter relation may make sense because
ruminating over a past event requires thinking back about
one’s emotions and thoughts at that time, which might come
with feelings of connection with one’s self in that past event.
Future studies could further look into the relations between
these different indicators of integration.
These ﬁndings have therapeutic implications, as integra-
tion of (past) events plays a central role in different treat-
ments. For example, in life review therapy, a central goal is
to emotionally process events from one’s past (Karel &
Hinrichsen, 2000), which has indeed been found to increase
well-being (e.g. more life satisfaction; Serrano, Latorre,
Gatz, & Montanes, 2004). It is less clear to date what the
precise mechanisms underlying this positive effect are and
whether it is possible to differentiate between adaptive and
maladaptive styles of reminiscence (Karel & Hinrichsen,
2000). Based on the results of this study, treatments involv-
ing reminiscence could focus on increasing a style character-
ized by acceptance and connection, while simultaneously
reducing ruminative thoughts. The present ﬁndings also ﬁt
within acceptance and mindfulness-based interventions, such
as acceptance and commitment therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, &
Wilson, 1999). Within acceptance and commitment therapy,
‘patients are encouraged to embrace unwanted thoughts and
feelings – such as anxiety, pain, and guilt – as an alternative
to experiential avoidance’ and ‘… to end the struggle with
unwanted thoughts and feelings without attempting to change
or eliminate them’ (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008, p. 5).
The role of depressive symptomatology and
self-congruence in the integrative process
A second goal was to identify personal characteristics that
either impede or foster the integrative process. First, we
examined the role of depressive symptoms because research
has shown that depression is related to rumination and intru-
sions of negative memories (e.g. Moulds & Krans, 2015) as
well as to decreased identiﬁcation with positive memories
(e.g. Lemogne et al., 2006). The present study focused on
both types of memories (i.e. negative and positive) and on
different aspects of integration (i.e. poor and high-quality
integration). Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that
depressive symptoms were related to difﬁculties to integrate
NFM and, to a lesser extent, NSM. Speciﬁcally, whereas
individuals scoring higher on depressive symptoms were less
accepting of and ruminated more over NFM, they reported
feeling somewhat less connected with NSM.
As previous studies mostly focused on personal charac-
teristics that impede the integrative process, we focused on
a possible protective factor as well, that is, self-congruence.
Self-congruence refers to the extent to which individuals
regulate their behaviour on the basis of personally held ideals,
values and interests (Weinstein et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2015).
Much like individuals high in self-congruence take responsi-
bility for their current behaviour, it seems that they also take
greater responsibility over past events. Indeed, the current
study indicated that self-congruence relates to greater integra-
tion of both NSM and NFM. More precisely, individuals high
in self-congruence experience a greater sense of connection
with the person they were during the event and also have ac-
cepted the event itself to a greater degree.
Combining the ﬁndings concerning depressive symptoms
and self-congruence, there seems to be some evidence for a
dual-route model, with one route representing the dark side
of the integrative process and with the other route
representing the bright side (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013).
Whereas depressive symptoms relate to memory-related
affect partly through poor integration (i.e. rumination), self-
congruence relates to memory-related affect only via high-
quality integration (i.e. connection and acceptance). Future
research is needed to conﬁrm the distinction between these
adaptive and maladaptive paths.
Figure 3. Third structural model depicting the relation between subsample, self-congruence and indicators of integration in need-frustrating memories.
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Integration among late adolescents and elderly
individuals
Although previous research has indicated that older individ-
uals display a better integration of memories, and especially
of negative ones, compared with younger individuals (e.g.
Torges et al., 2008), the mechanism behind this age differ-
ence is less clear. Based on SDT’s (Deci & Ryan, 2000)
and Erikson’s (1950) tenet that integrative functioning
increases with age and previous studies showing a higher
level of autonomous functioning among older individuals
(Sheldon et al., 2005), we proposed that higher levels of
self-congruence might enable older individuals to better inte-
grate past events.
First, our ﬁndings showed that elderly, when compared
with late adolescents, were indeed better capable of integrat-
ing past need-frustrating (but not need-satisfying) events.
Said differently, the scar of the need-frustrating event was
less deep for them, in spite of the fact that they had elicited
a more emotionally intense and more central event. Second,
we found that these effects were partially accounted for by
self-congruence. Because elderly individuals experience
their current behaviour to be more congruent with their core
values and interests, they seem to gain greater authorship
over their past: that is, they reported more feelings of accep-
tance of and connection to negative past events. However,
there remained a direct association between subsample and
connection and acceptance, indicating that other mechanisms
also may play a role, which could be examined in future
studies. One candidate mechanism is older people’s selective
attention to the beneﬁts of past negative events and to the
lessons that can be retrieved from these events (e.g. Mather
& Carstensen, 2005).
Limitations and directions for future research
As our study had a cross-sectional design, no causal infer-
ences can be made. This is important because studies have
shown that depressive symptoms do not only predict indica-
tors of integration (e.g. rumination), but that these indicators
also predict depressive symptoms (Hamlat et al., 2015).
Future experimental or longitudinal studies could further
shed light on the temporal ordering of, on the one hand, the
two personal characteristics examined in this study (i.e. de-
pressive symptoms and self-congruence) and, on the other
hand, the indicators of the integration of need-related memo-
ries. Additionally, the memory-speciﬁc affect ratings by
participants could be partially coloured by individuals’ global
affect. To generate a purer measure of memory-speciﬁc
affect, future studies could also include a pre-measure of
general affect, thereby treating general affect as a covariate
in the analyses. Further, we only focused on relatively young
individuals (on average 18 years) and elderly individuals
(on average 76 years), thereby excluding a large age group
in between these groups, that is, midlife adults. Stewart and
Vandewater (1999) argued that conducting a life review at
middle age is common and may lead individuals to make mi-
nor or even major changes in their life. Even among children,
meaning-making of stressful events is apparent (Mossige,
Jensen, Gulbrandsen, Reichelt, & Tjersland, 2005). Future
studies could, therefore, include additional age groups to get
more insight into the life-span development of the integration
of need-related memories. Additionally, because participants
in the current study provided only a brief account of the
memories, it would be interesting for future research to gather
(besides questionnaire data) fuller accounts of these memories
to enable qualitative coding of integration indicators. Finally,
to gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of
high-quality and poor integration, future studies could
include additional integration indicators, such as avoidance
(Carvalho, Dinis, Pinto-Gouveia, & Estanqueiro, 2015) and
positive interpretation (Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011).
CONCLUSION
The present study suggests that integration of past events
may play a role in individuals’ current functioning and
well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Weinstein et al., 2013).
The current ﬁndings show that self-congruence relates posi-
tively to this capacity for integration, while depressive symp-
toms show a negative relation. This integrative capacity was
more present among late adults, which seems at least par-
tially driven by older people’s increasing display of self-
congruence.
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